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idaho native
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Posted: Mon Feb 8th, 2010 05:25 pm |
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Commanders somewhat aside I have been thinking about how topography actually affected the closing hours of the battle on April 6. Federal troops had been pushed back several miles toward Pittsburg Landing. These troops were in a state of disarray as were the confederates. Corps, divisions and regiments were all jumbled up on both sides. The union had amassed 50 artillery pieces including several siege guns and a number of 20 pounder Parrotts at the landing in "Grants Last Line". This line which was supported by some infantry never was tested very much because Beauregard withdrew the confederate troops as dusk fell. The Union federal gunboats Tyler & lexington were also positioned so they could enfilade troops trying to negotiate Dills Branch Ravine.
What would have happened if the confederates had not of withdrawn? Could large numbers of them (reportedly Withers command actually got through the ravine before being recalled) have successfully negotiated Dills Branch Ravine (which was probably partially flooded with water) and other topographical features between their lines and the union last line of defense and garnered a victory on the first day or did topography do as much to close the battle on the first day as the union land defenses, the union gunboats and Beauregards decision to discontinue the engagement????
Maybe we discussed this before but I think that the terrain & vegetation had a huge impact on troop movement during both days of the battle & also on the outcome of the battle.Last edited on Mon Feb 8th, 2010 06:01 pm by idaho native
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tcb816
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Posted: Mon Feb 8th, 2010 05:44 pm |
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The Dills Branch Ravine is something even today and the vegetation.Like you I think getting over it with the flooded water would had been a job.This is only a guess but I believe that most of the southern troops near the branch would have been move over to the left and go around.Leaving some there to keep nothern troops in place there. You have to recall it would had also been a job that nite for the northern troops to also get through the ravine.I seem to recall that Gen. Forrest wanting to do something that nite but could not get anyone to lisen to him.Any news on this I just seem to recall that.
AARON YATES
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idaho native
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Posted: Mon Feb 8th, 2010 05:54 pm |
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| Forrest had forces out most of the night checking on what the federals were doing. Some of them were even dressed in federal overcoats. Either his men or Forrest himself or both knew Grant was being reinforced. They saw Buells Army being transported from the east to the west side of the river. Forrest tried to find Beauregard several times to tell him but could not find him. He found Chalmers but could get no one to do anything. He was pushing for a night attack (which might or might not have been successful) before Grant was completely reinforced. Even though both Forrest and union general Prentiss told the confederates Buell was there the high command did not believe them because they had heard other reports Buell was heading elsewhere & was not in route to Pittsburg Landing. If the confederate high command had listened to either Forrest or Prentiss or both maybe things would have been different.
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"In our youth our hearts were touched with fire." - Oliver Wendell Holmes Jr.
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Ron
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Posted: Mon Feb 8th, 2010 07:20 pm |
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Hello Aaron,
General Sherman, as I mentioned in a earlier post, did not do a good job before the battle. This includes the time period from when he returned from the expedition up the river to Eastport, to about 7:15 am on Sunday, April 6th. What happened then, on that Sunday morning that changed his mid. He got a jolt in the form of a minie ball in the finger. This woke him up to the real situation and the danger. He proceeded to act as a division commander, moving troops around, calling for reinforcements and more ammunition. His division stood on the Shiloh church plateau and held off Hardee's attack until 9:30 am when his flanks gave way. NOTICE THAT AGAIN, I MENTION THE FLANKS GAVE WAY. He then proceeded to form a nre position at the intersection of the Purdy road and the Western Corinth road. A series of moves followed to new positions as other positions were lost as the rebel troops advanced. Here, Sherman and McClernand cooperated very well as they jointly took up these positions, and led a counterattack down out of the Jones field. These two commanders and their men were very effective in delaying the confederate attack. The right half of the union positions were in capable hands despite the necessity of their withdrawal back to the River road. The rebel pressure against them was heavy and constant, and only relaxed when most of the rebel troops were sent to the other side of the battlefield to help overcome W H L Wallace, Prentiss and Hurlbut men.
On Monday, Sherman's attack quickly passed Lew Wallace's slow forward movement. It was a left wheel forward movement by Sherman and McClernand, again acting together, that applied very heavy pressure in the Woolf field/Water Oaks pond area. They continued a slow advance against Beauregard's final position on the Shiloh Church plateau.
Sherman acted as a commanding officer in every measure, under pressure, in fierce combat. I believe that the shot that struck him on Sunday morning and released the lion within him was the worse shot for the confederacy. Despite being criticized by many, often for minor points, he went on to a effective leadership role in the civil war.
Ron
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Ron
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Posted: Mon Feb 8th, 2010 07:42 pm |
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Sharon,
A rebel attack down through the Dill Creek Ravine??? No, No, No, No. Too late in the day, night was approaching, Troops were tired, hungry, half of the units were disorganized, other units were kept firmly in control by their commanders such as Withers. Withers had two brigades with him, Chalmers was able to attack but Jackson's men were out of ammunition. His third brigade was not with him. He had only one battery present, Gage's which was quickly silenced by the vast numbers of union guns. Girardey's battery was in the rear. The rebel attack in the ravine would have been crushed by Webster's line of guns. Other rebel troops if they attempted to move around the head of the ravine would have ran into the line of troops formed by Grant along the road leading to the landing. They had artillery to back them up while rebel artillery was questionalble. The rebel army was NOT ORGANIZED FOR THIS FINAL ATTACK IN OR NEAR THE DILL CREEK RAVINE. Disorganized, tired, hungry, no to little artillery support, their reserves were not in position to push the attack, some were out of ammunition, no time to resupply the men with ammunition, it was getting dark, the federal troops had withdrew into a compact formation along the river road and the landing road, the union men were waiting for the rebels. the federal retreat was good for the northern troops as they moved into their resupply area while the confederates moved away from their supplies, the consistency of confederate units was that of a wet wash rag.
And so Sharon, My opinion is that a Dill Creek ravine attack would have been a disaster for the confederate army. General Beauregard, for once, was correct to call off the attack when he did.
Ron
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Perry Neal
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Posted: Sun Feb 14th, 2010 06:04 pm |
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| Dill branch i think yes bad idea but around the left yes had to be tried i dont agree with P.G.T. to call it off the first day keep rolling while your rolling P.G.T. didnt want to fight to begin with so naturally im not surprised he called it off but on the other hand i do think Sherman did a great job once he relized the fight was on i believe he had four horses shot out from under him the devils own day he replied to Grant yes i do admire Shermans performance at Shiloh
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WI16thJim
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Posted: Mon Feb 15th, 2010 12:41 pm |
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Larry J. Daniel writes in "Shiloh", pages 117-118:
" ............. Beauregard, as he had done two weeks earlier, jumped to a single conclusion - the Federals had divided their forces for another raid on the Mobile & Ohio. Since this information was now thirty-six hours old, time was of the essence. He promptly endorsed the telegram: "Now is the moment to advance and strike the enemy at Pittsburg Landing.
Jordan carried the dispatch to Johnston at the Rose Cottage. Upon reading it, the general proceeded to the Curlee house on Jackson Street, where he aroused Bragg. The corp commander, remaining in bed throughout the conversation, concurred with Beauregard's endorsement, but Johnston (according to Jordan) protested that the army was not prepared for an offensive. Only after the colonel had allayed his fears did the army commander allow the appropriate order to be drafted. Historians have questioned the account, citing inconsistencies in Jordan's own writings....."
I have found it is rather difficult to determine who was in favor of (or opposed to) an attack on Shiloh. Some we have never heard from (Johnston) and others memory seems to have changed after the battle ( ? Beauregard, Jordan, etc. ?)
Jim
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WI16thJim
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Posted: Mon Feb 15th, 2010 05:23 pm |
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OK, riddle me this! Daniel writes about Johnston's vacillating about whether to attack or not. Then at the bottom of page 129 he tells of Beauregard's later claim to not having proposed a retreat but a reconnaissance-in-force. Daniel then proceeds to pooh pooh this idea. The next paragraph, page 130:
"If Johnston had listened to Beauregard, postwar and modern writers would doubtless have envisioned a hypothetical Battle of Shiloh in which Grant's army was crushed."
Am I missing something? How does he jump to this conclusion, which seems to go against his own reasoning?
Jim
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True is his, for life is o'er
Sarpedon of the mighty war.
Herman Melville 1866 A Dirge for McPherson
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Wrap10
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Posted: Mon Feb 15th, 2010 11:50 pm |
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Jim,
It does get to be a bit of a maze, but here's my take on it.
First, on A.S. Johnston, there's no doubt in my mind that he favored an attack from start to finish. The only real question in his mind, I think, was the timing. Daniel mentions that historians have questioned Jordon's account about Johnston's supposed protest on the night of the 2nd. I can't remember if he brings this up or maybe it's Edward Cunningham, but I think one of them brings up the possibility of Johnston questioning Jordon in a way that caused Jordon, then or later, to believe that Johnston was against the attack, when such was not actually the case.
Beauregard too favored an attack, and I'm 100% convinced that his post-battle claim of a 'giant raid,' as I think Sword terms it, is mainly a classic case of fanny covering. Rather than claim it was meant to be a battle of annihilation, which I think Beauregard clearly understood was the goal, he used his report to bring the pre-battle expectations more in line with the actual result. Fudging the facts a bit in his report doesn't make him unique of course, but I'm convinced this is what he did. It might also have been intended to soften the blow somewhat in Richmond, once it was realized that Grant's army had not been destroyed or even forced to retreat.
But the reality, as I see it, is that both Johnston and Beauregard were convinced that an attack was the best move. The details of exactly how to do it is where they seem to have had a miscommunication somewhere along the way. That's the great mystery that no one has ever seemed to really clear up, how such a good battle plan on paper got thrown so completely out the window.
What does surprise me some though, if I remember right from his book, is that Daniel appears to accept Beauregard at his word in that post-battle report. He seems to believe that Beauregard looked on the whole affair as a giant raid rather than an all-out battle. I'm not sure that Daniel does actually believe this, but it does seem to come across that way to me in his book. Sword, in his own book, I think isn't quite sure what to make of that report, since it obviously doesn't conform to what Johnston clearly had in mind. He sort of figuratively scratches his head about it in the book, then moves on.
I really think Johnston and Beauregard were both on the same page before the battle about the need to attack. The confusion was in the details, not in the overall goal. Beauregard changed his mind only on the eve of the attack, and only because he thought the circumstances had changed. He feared, not without good reason, that the Union army had been alerted to the Confederate army's presence, and would be ready for them.
He is often said to have lost his nerve at this point, but that's not how I view it. He knew the entire affair hinged on surprise, and he feared that key element had been lost. I don't think he lost his nerve so much as he no longer felt the odds favored the Confederates, and in fact now favored the Union army too much to risk an attack. This is where Johnston fully asserted his authority as the army commander and ordered the attack to go forward.
Daniel believes, or at least did when he wrote his book, that Johnston remained 'pathetically insecure' I think is how he terms it, even after he ordered the attack for dawn on the 6th. (That phrase has stuck with me, because it still amazes me.) He says something to the effect that Johnston was seeking reassurance from one of his staff officers, or I forget exactly who. But I just don't think that's true. Johnston had decided to go forward with the attack, and nothing was going to change his mind. I just don't see that he was seeking reassurance, and nothing he did the next day indicates to me that he had doubts about the attack, or was insecure.
I think Beauregard and Johnston were working at cross-purposes during the battle, probably inadvertently, but I also think Beauregard was doing his level-best to win the battle. He claimed after the fact that it was only meant to be a raid, to drive the Union army back long enough to capture supplies and such, which conforms more to what actually happened. But that wasn't the goal going in, and Beauregard knew it.
Perry
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"And all is hushed at Shiloh." - Herman Melville
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